Hi all
Sorry for the delay on posts. I am currently working on something that I think is quite good but it needs a bit more time as it's quite long. In the meantime I'm posting a paper on existentialist ethics that I wrote for honours last year. It is damn long. It does however, contain a large part of what I think is the correct way of 'doing' ethics if you're an atheist. I hope it is not too dense. For those of you who are interested it scored a 90-95%.
Sorry for the delay on posts. I am currently working on something that I think is quite good but it needs a bit more time as it's quite long. In the meantime I'm posting a paper on existentialist ethics that I wrote for honours last year. It is damn long. It does however, contain a large part of what I think is the correct way of 'doing' ethics if you're an atheist. I hope it is not too dense. For those of you who are interested it scored a 90-95%.
In this paper I will argue that an existentialist ethics is entirely possible, and is quite capable of fulfilling the practical requirements of an ethics. That is to say, an existentialist ethics is capable of furnishing values, providing guidance to the individual regarding right and wrong conduct, and allows for the condemnation of certain behaviours and characters. My inquiry will proceed in the following manner: first, I will undertake a preliminary analysis of the existentialist’s ontology to uncover how they arrive at the origin of value. Having completed this ontological investigation, I will move to address a criticism of Plantinga’s that this ontology of value makes it impossible to delineate between right and wrong.[1] I will move on from here to explain how it is that existentialist ethics have any authority, that is, how they become binding on the individual. This will require a discussion of the overall existentialist project, in particular, their approach to rescuing meaning from absurdity. Next, I will explain how existentialist ethics provides a means of judging others, in particular the infamous example of the authentic torturer. At the conclusion of this analysis I will address a concern for existentialist ethics, which is that they have sometimes been accused of making freedom into an idol, which would no sync with the rest of their philosophy. I will explain how this interpretation could potentially be applied to Sartre but not to Beauvoir, who distinguishes between two levels of freedom – Ontological and Moral.
Sartre’s ontology in Being and Nothingness is quite complex. Fortunately, I don’t think an exposition of all his ideas therein is necessary to furnish an understanding of existentialist ontology that is sufficient for our needs in this paper. A clarification of Sartre’s expression “existence precedes essence” combined with an explanation of the existentialist’s atheism will prove adequate to explain why “man is condemned to be free.” Man’s condemned condition is the ontological foundation of existentialist ethics.
Existence precedes essence refers to the notion that man is a creature that defines his being from one temporal moment to the next, rather than emerging into the world with a fixed essence. He does not have a fixed essence in the way that gold is defined as being comprised of 79 protons per atom. Man does not have a fixed being; he is in a constant state of becoming; as Sartre so eloquently puts it: “man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world – and defines himself afterwards.”[2] If essence precedes existence, it means that somewhere a conception of the final product must exist before it is brought about in the world. Sartre gives the example of a paper knife. For a paper knife to be a paper knife is must meet certain criteria, and it is designed and produced with those criteria in mind. When it no longer meets those criteria – if the blade and the handle are separated, for example – it is no longer a paper knife.
Man is obviously different. Man, that is to say each man, exists first as χ – let’s say Karl – and then defines who is thereafter. The designation man is not determinative. Karl may choose to become an engineer or a carpenter, an astronaut or a politician. He may become wise or stupid, loving or callous, right wing or left wing, an intellectual or a tradesman. But whatever he becomes, he will be nothing more or less than the totality of what he is at any one time. This is what Sartre means when he says: “Essence is what has been. Essence is everything in the human being which we can indicate by the words – that is.”[3] This is why a man will never be a totality until the moment of death. Man can never define his being until the moment at which he dies, as that is the moment of completion. Hence Beauvoir’s fondness for the words of Montaigne: “the continuous work of our lives is to build death.”[4] “Karl is” or “I am” can never refer to the future or totality of Karl or me, because our future is always open. Until the moment of death, each man maintains an open future. His being is always to be decided. Man is that being whose being is not to be.[5]
Man is then defined by his choices and his actions. At each moment in time man is aware of his past and the open possibility of his future, and he makes a choice. That choice then becomes a part of his past and comes to define him in the here and now when we talk of who he is. But then immediately man is confronted with another moment and another choice, and thus man’s being is never complete and is always under construction. Man is thus “nothing else but the sum of his actions, nothing else but what his life is.”[6] He is untapped possibility, but his possibilities can never be until he chooses to actualise some and forgo others. Hence man is only ever his choices. Sartre expresses this very neatly when he says:
Why should we attribute to Racine
Existence precedes essence can thus be seen to refer to the fact that man is free to choose what he wants to be. He is defined by his actions and no-one, not even himself, can claim that he is anything but what has come to pass thus far. Man “is nothing else but he makes of himself.” [8]
We are now equipped with an understanding of the meaning of “existence precedes essence”. However, this is not sufficient to explain the ontological proposition, “man is condemned to be free”, which is fundamental to existentialist ethics. In order to achieve such a definition, we need to look at Sartre and Beauvoir’s atheism and its two key ramifications. First, with the death of God, any possibility of having objective values disappears – “There can no longer be any good a priori, since there is no infinite and perfect consciousness to think it.”[9] Second, there is no possibility of a designer of man in the way that man is the designer of a pen knife, because there is no infinite and perfect consciousness that is across time and space and can thus determine an individual’s fate beforehand. Man has no pre-ordained destiny. Each man’s life does not unfold in accordance with God’s grand plan and his ‘mysterious ways’. It unfolds the way each man chooses it to unfold. Man cannot explain his actions “by reference to a given and specific human nature”. “In other words,” says Sartre “there is no determinism”.[10] Indeterminism and the absence of objective values combine to produce a situation in which “we have neither behind us, nor before us in a luminous realm of values, any means of justification or excuse – we are alone, without excuse”.[11] Man is responsible for any choices he makes. He can never have any ultimate justification of his choices – they remain his choices born entirely of his subjectivity. He can never say that it was not his choice, that it was determined for him or that he ‘had to’ make such and such a choice because there is some rule written into the firmament that he must follow.
Now we can understand Sartre’s fundamental ontological claim that man is condemned to be free. Man is defined by his choices because his existence precedes his essence, and nothing can ever justify his choices, because there is no God to conceive of the good a priori. Man is entirely responsible for what he does and what he is.[12] Nothing compels him to make a certain choice; nothing forces him from outside himself. Man is condemned because he did not choose to born but he is nonetheless at liberty, and from the moment he is thrown into the world he cannot avoid making choices.
So what are the consequences of this atheistic ontology for morality? Well, put simply, man, according to existentialism, is the source of all values. With the death of god and the denial of any human nature there is no sense in which a value could ever be extrinsic to an individual. It could never exist ‘out there’ in the universe, somehow written into the firmament. No value ever existed until man was born and saturated the world with values – his values. A value could potentially be a shared value, but then it would be shared by individuals. Even a value held universally by everyone would still find its origin in each individual person.
Man creates these values through his choices. Through his decisions and his actions, man’s values are revealed and imbue the world with meaning. Man is thus the authority behind a value – it is only valuable in as much as he values it:
I do not have nor can I have recourse to any value against the fact that it is I who sustain values in being. Nothing can ensure me against myself, cut off from the world and from my essence by this nothingness which I am. I have to realise the meaning of the world and of my essence; I make my decision concerning them – without justification and without excuse.[13]
For the existentialists then, every choice defines the good – “to choose between this or that is at the same time to affirm the value of that which is chosen; for we are unable ever to choose the worse”.[14] What is meant by this last statement “we are unable ever to choose the worse?” It means that man’s choice can never be an ‘evil’ choice, because the ‘good’ is created by choices and the hierarchy of values that they reveal. A choice can never be evil because man never chooses something that does not disclose his values – his ‘good’. Therefore, a choice can never go against any established notion of good, because it is man who determines what is good. With the death of God any possibility of an a priori standard of good and evil has disappeared. Therefore man always chooses the good, but he is also ultimately and entirely responsible for what he has chosen.
The existentialists describe the attempt to obscure or divest oneself of this responsibility as bad faith. The most well known example of someone who tries to attempt such a disassociation is Sartre’s ‘serious man’. The serious man finds a value of his, say Christianity or Nationalism or even something like Bourgeois social customs, and then raises this value to the status of an idol. That is to say, he argues that this value of his is written into the firmament and not simply born of his own will. He attempts to ignore his condition as the source of all values and instead follows the normative prescriptions of something that he discovers ‘out there’, as though such an obedience were unavoidable – an obligation rather than a choice. Sartre also gives the example of an individual who blames his actions on his ‘passion’; that he was unable to choose otherwise because his frenzy got the better of him.[15] Other examples exist, such as Beauvoir’s sub-man and her ‘adventurer’, but the theme that unites all these types is their refusal to accept that their values are subjective, and all their behaviour is founded on a personal choice.[16] Each needs more of a guarantee of the worth of their projects than their own convictions.
We now have an understanding of existentialist ethics that is sufficiently articulated to be able to consider the most common criticism of it. Plantinga puts it thus: “Sartre’s ontology of freedom makes it impossible to draw a distinction between right and wrong, and therefore cuts off the very possibility of moral endeavour or action.”[17] For Plantinga, Sartre’s ontology of value removes any possibility of condemning the actions of others, or of trying to be ‘good’ in the sense that one follows rules of good conduct, because the content of the word ‘good’ is contained within your choices and revealed through your actions. Presumably, he wants some way of declaring outright, that individuals like Hitler, or especially total psychopaths like Ted Bundy, are evil.
I do not think this criticism is fair towards existentialist ethics. It belies an unwillingness to fully appreciate the overall existentialist project. In many traditional theories of morality, such as in Divine command theory, Kantianism or Utilitarianism, morality has been located not in the individual, but in an act or its consequences. The individual’s actions therefore, can be measured against these external standards, and judged as right or wrong. Obviously, this sort of thing is impossible within an existentialist framework, as the individual defines the good through his actions. However, it is still up to the individual to choose an ethics. Because man is responsible for everything he does, there is no sense he which he could be unethical – “he cannot avoid choosing.”[18] An individual’s values then, are not simply a collection of whims and fancies that are devoid of real ethical content. The individual very much considers his values binding on his behaviour, but this authority derives entirely from him. He is responsible for what he does:
This individualism does not lead to the anarchy of personal whim. Man is free; but he finds his law in his very freedom. First, he must assume his freedom and not flee it; he assumes it by a constructive movement: one does not exist without doing something;[19]
Traditionalist ethicists like Plantinga hold on to a narrow conception of ethics in which the absence of extrinsic ethical rules means the absence of any moral authority, but in the existentialist system, there is a moral authority that is directly tied in to an individual’s self interest. The individual has chosen his own values, and will therefore enforce that on himself much more readily than if they were imposed upon him from outside.
Plantinga and others would perhaps counter that this is inadequate for an ethics, as it allows an individual to constantly re-design his values to suit any given situation. The moral authority of the self is meaningless if an individual can decide at any one moment that what he was up until now was an error, and proceed differently into the future. Sartre describes this criticism in the following way: “your values are not serious, since you choose them yourselves”.[20] This criticism implies a lack of confidence in the existentialist’s overall project. If we examine the entire philosophy of Beauvoir and Sartre and their approach to the challenge of man’s ambiguous condition, we find that existentialism is, at its core, an attempt to explain man’s experience of life so that he may more easily and effectively find joy in it. Already in Being and Nothingness, Sartre clearly expresses such sentiments:
Existential psychoanalysis is going to reveal to man the real goal of his pursuit, which is being as a synthetic fusion of the in-itself with the for-itself; existential psychoanalysis is going to acquaint man with his passion. In truth there are many men who have practised this psychoanalysis on themselves and who have not waited to learn its principles in order to make use of them as a means of deliverance and salvation. Many men, in fact, know that the goal of their pursuit is being; and to the extent that they possess this knowledge, they refrain from appropriating things for their own sake and try to realize the symbolic appropriation of their being-in-itself.[21]
An individual who abuses their freedom in the manner the critics are concerned with will never achieve this joy in life. I alluded to this idea earlier when I mentioned that existentialism directly links ethical behaviour to self-interest. The weight of existentialist ethics lies in its promise of “deliverance and salvation” from absurdity.
How is this joy in life to be effected? This is a complicated question and will require some thorough elucidation. Let us begin with Sartre’s claim that man is in a constant state of desiring to be, a desire for being-in-itself – a longing for control over one’s destiny and an absolute identity. Man wants to be a totality. But for man this is impossible because he is constantly changing and evolving. He will not achieve totality until the moment when he achieves death. Man’s being is thus not only in-itself but also for-itself. His is a kind of being that can never be except for an infinitesimally small moment in time. Man is thus “that being whose being is not to be”.[22] But, argue the existentialists, man also desires to disclose being, even if only for an infinitesimally small moment. In order for man to be satisfied with his existence, he must realise that he is a constant striving for being that can only be realised momentarily before becoming a striving once again – “let man put his will to be ‘in parenthesis’ and he will thereby be brought to the consciousness of his true condition.”[23] A simpler though not entirely accurate way of rephrasing this statement is that man desires to ‘see’ himself. Man wants to apprehend his reflection in the world. Man wants to experience his being, and this, claim the existentialists, is very possible for him:
Now, we have seen that the original scheme of man is ambiguous: he wants to be, and to the extent that he coincides with this wish, he fails. All the plans in which this will to be is actualized are condemned; and the ends circumscribed by these plans remain mirages. Human transcendence is vainly engulfed in those miscarried attempts. But man also wills himself to be a disclosure of being, and if he coincides with this wish, he wins, for the fact is that the world becomes a present by his presence in it. But the disclosure implies a perpetual tension to keep being at a certain distance, to tear oneself form the world, and to assert oneself as a freedom.[24]
In order for man to disclose his being, he must first create it through his values and his actions. If he then acts in keeping with his values, if he lives with integrity, he if he lives authentically, man discloses his being because he “coincides” with himself. Coincidence refers to the momentary meeting of the for-itself with the in-itself. It refers to man’s action in the present disclosing his being as it is defined by his actions up until now. Man grasps himself through authenticity. This is the origin of meaning in man’s universe – this is how meaning is rescued from absurdity. Man gives meaning to his life – “it is up to man to make it important to be a man, and he alone can feel his success or failure.”[25]
This process relies on the absolute freedom of man. One cannot live in accordance with one’s morals in an authentic fashion if the values that inform those morals are not freely chosen. I cannot coincide with myself if I obey an extrinsic principle that my will is constantly in opposition to. This does not mean that I cannot follow the categorical imperative or believe in the efficacy of the utilitarian calculus, it merely insists that I must choose to value these ideas myself from a deep subjective conviction. I cannot take them as idols. This is the meaning behind Sartre’s statement: “doubtless he chooses without reference to any pre-established value, but it is unjust to tax him with caprice.”[26] If I establish my values as idols, if I am ‘serious’, I cut myself off from the potential for disclosure. In order for my values to be useful, they must be my own creations. This is why Beauvoir’s states that “to will oneself moral and to will oneself free are one and the same decision.”[27] I must actively desire my ontological freedom, not just possess it, if I am to be able to grasp authentic existence. If I will my freedom, then all my values are my choices. If I will against my freedom – that is, if I live in bad faith – then my values are not my choices, and they can never bring me into coincidence with myself.
We are now able to return to the criticism that an existentialist could simply change moment to moment and thus his moral authority over himself is worthless. This criticism does not hold because an individual could never coincide with himself if his identity is in a constant state of flux. As Beauvoir explains: “One escapes the absurdity of the clinamen only by escaping the absurdity of the pure moment. An existence would be unable to found itself if moment by moment it crumbled into nothingness.”[28] In order for a value to assist us in disclosing being it must be affirmed repeatedly and finds its place within the stable core of our identity. A value that is here today and gone tomorrow can never assist us in our quest for meaning:
I can not genuinely desire an end today without desiring it through my whole existence, insofar as it is the future of this present moment and insofar as it is the surpassed past of days to come. To will is to engage myself to persevere in my will.[29]
The weight of existentialist ethics then, is that if the individual desires a life that is enjoyable, a life in which he is not constantly overwhelmed by the ambiguity of his existence, then he must choose ethics and enforce them upon himself. The individual is thus a perfectly adequate arbiter over his behaviour. No individual would want to break his ethical rules if that meant the denial of his personal happiness.
In responding to the earlier criticism regarding the seriousness of existentialist values, a new problem immediately arises. How can the individual have such confidence their values? If all values are freely and subjectively created, how can the individual know if they are right? But Beauvoir insists that any doubts will be swept away by the experience of disclosure. She writes that: “any man who has known real loves, real revolts, real desires, and real will knows quite well that he has no need of any outside guarantee to be sure of his goals; their certitude comes from his own drive.”[30] Sartre Expresses similar sentiments when he writes that “one need not hope in order to undertake one’s work.”[31]
Thus far I have talked exclusively about how the individual creates meaning for himself and functions as moral arbiter over himself. I have said nothing about how we can condemn others. Existentialism has come under criticism for not providing a means of judging as ‘bad’ the actions of someone who is behaving authentically but in a socially abhorred way. The most famous example used in this critique is Detmer’s hypothetical authentic torturer: “a torturer who candidly says, ‘I have freely chosen to kidnap and torture you, and I take full responsibility for my choice’ is apparently above criticism.”[32]
Existential ethics has made two separate attempts to rejoin this criticism. First, let us look at Sartre. In Existentialism as a Humanism Sartre suggests “when I choose for me I choose for everyone.”[33] What is implied here is that when I create a value I suggest that it is universal. I as a man have thought it valuable, and thus is must be valuable for all men – “I am thus responsible for myself and for all men, and I am creating a certain image of man as I would have him be. In fashioning myself I fashion man.”[34] Because of this, Sartre suggests that we must ask ourselves whenever we take an action, “what would happen if everyone did so?” To not do so would be in bad faith.[35] If the authentic torturer were to ask himself this question, he would realise that he himself would be the subject of kidnap and torture, and would likely refrain from his behaviour.
Sartre’s position here seems very weak to me. Crucially, the move from an individual holding a value to it being universal is dubious. As Sartre himself frequently points out, existentialism begins in the cogito, the ‘I think’, and this would suggest that every value has a fundamentally subjective quality. Each man is different, and what works for one may not work for everyone. There are many values that I would not want to see applied universally, but that are very socially expedient if they exist in a limited number of people. For example, imagine if everyone were a stickler for the law (including things like jaywalking) and rules in general (for example, those tedious procedural protocols that are often unnecessary). In this case, society would not be a particularly enjoyable place to live in. By the same token, if society were full of the opposite kind of person, who has little respect for the rules, society would equally be quite unenjoyable. In addition to this argument that the similarity of all men is not socially expedient, I also have a weaker concern that if everyone held the same values, the world of man would become very boring.
There is an additional problem with Sartre’s claims here, which is that he appears to be acting in bad faith. Arp points out that “Sartre’s line of argument here is misguided. It does not jibe with his analysis of situation in Being and Nothingness. It is even inconsistent with some of the examples of choice that Sartre gives later in this same text.”[36] This confusion has also been noted by Rau, who explains that the particular problem is that Sartre’s comments are Kantian.[37] The statement “when I choose for me I choose for everyone” sounds very similar to the first formulation of the categorical imperative: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law” (Kant, p. 30)[38] But everything else in existentialism speaks against the categorical imperative, as we have already seen. Man cannot freely choose if there is a rule embeded in the firmament against which all choices must be measured. In the above passage from Existentialism is a Humanism, Sartre seems guilty of bad faith precisely when he is accusing others of bad faith.
Beauvoir takes a different approach. She argues that in order for us to be able to effectively will our freedom and bring about the disclosure of being, we must exist in a society where man is oppressed as little as possible. As a consequence of this line of thinking, if I will my own freedom, I must necessarily will the freedom of others – I cannot kidnap and torture. But how can this be true? Surely if I value my freedom I do not want anything to get in the way of it, I want to be able to go out and affirm myself, to impose my forms upon the world? If that requires violence, theft, dishonesty and the like, then so be it. But Beauvoir suggests that the extent to which I can live out my freedom and exercise my will is bound up in the ability of others to do the same. This is because the world in which I live is a social world imbued with not just my own meanings and values but the meaning and values of others. It is “penetrated with human meaning”.[39] As Arp explains,
“the human world depends on the existence of other human beings. The meanings with which it is saturated do not originate in me alone. They are inter-subjectively constituted…the existence of other subjects is the condition of the existence of the human world.”[40]
My projects and values are created in a world of other men and find their meaning in application to a world “saturated” with the meaning of others. The meaning of my projects and values then, is dependent on the values and projects of others.
An example might help furnish more insight into this position. Say I am inclined towards the environmentalist cause. This is a value that I hold. Its affirmation will lead to a disclosure of my being. But in order that I might affirm this value in a meaningful way I will need others. I will need compatriotes who will recycle my garbage, produce Dolphin safe tuna, give me a voice in the legislator and attend rallies with me. I also need, presumably, opposition to be overcome – individuals who want air conditioning everywhere, who want to continue the production of fuel inefficient cars. Without others, my exploits would quickly disappear into insignificance. My values neccesarily exist in a human world rather than simply a world, and they are thus intimately bound up with the values of others:
To will that there be being is also to will that there be men by and for whom the world is endowed with human signification. One can reveal the world only on a basis revealed by other men. No project can be defined except by its interference with other projects.[41]
If I am to be able to effectively will my own freedom I must desire a world that is saturated as densely as possible with the meaning of others. This is impossible if my peers are not free. The grandeur, magnitude and diversity of my projects is directly related to the ability of my peers to will their own freedom. If I will my own freedom, I must will the freedom of others. Hence I cannot behave as an unconscionable brute or an authentic torturer, because then I would be impinging upon the freedom of another.
While Beauvoir’s line of argument is strong with regards to broad ranging macro-level ethical considerations, I don’t think it can really hold on a micro, everyday level. As Arp points out “The Ethics of Ambiguity is definitely not an ethics of private life.”[42] The authentic torturer could will the freedom of others by and large, such as by being anti-fascist, while still engaging in the odd instance of kidnap and torture. Willing the freedom of most others would appear sufficient to achieve a human world – I do not have to will the freedom of everyone. There is the additional problem that many day to day ethical dilemmas do not involve freedom as a factor. It is perhaps unfair to tax Beauvoir in this way, as her ethics are evidently meant to give a foundation to political engagement.In addition, I feel there is room in the ethical system I have sketched out for the existentialists to rejoin this criticism, but neither Sartre nor Beauvoir ever did, and any attempts I could make to do so are outside the scope of this paper.
One additional comment seems worthy of addressing. Morgan has suggested that, in her account of freedom, Beauvoir has elevated it to the status of idol, and is thus guilty of bad faith. She suggests that because for Beauvoir freedom is “the first justification” and “as such, any other justified value derives from it”, Beauvoir holds that “freedom is an absolute value”.[43] In this case it follows that Beauvoir is acting in bad faith, because she is establishing a situation in which man cannot choose otherwise than to will freedom.
While many post Sartrean philosophers of existentialist ethics, notably Anderson, have indeed tried to set up freedom as an idol, I do not agree that Beauvoir is guilty of doing the same.[44] This is because, as Arp points out, she distinguishes between two levels of freedom – ontological freedom, which is absolute, and moral freedom, which is a freely chosen value.[45] Morgan is thus incorrect in saying that values derive their justification from freedom. Values will exist no matter what simply because I create them through my actions. They never receive ‘justification’. That is the whole point of existentialist ethics.[46] Moreover, freedom itself is not immediately a value – I must choose to will my freedom. Only then does it become a value. I can possess values without valueing my freedom. Granted, Beauvoir argues that if I am to effectively disclose my being I must will my freedom, but this does not locate freedom as the source of all value. It is merely the suggestion that if you want to lead an enjoyable life, you would do well to will your freedom. If freedom were an abosolute value in Morgan’s sense, then bad faith would be immoral, as it would contravene the absolute value of freedom. But the existentialists are quite clear that bad faith is not immoral, merely illogical; note Sartre’s words: “it is not for me to judge him morally, but I define his self-deception as an error.”[47] Beauvoir similarly points out that bad faith is a choice – “one can choose not to will himself free. In laziness, heedlessness, capriciousness, cowardice, impatience, one contests the meaning of the project at the very moment that one defines it.”[48] If one does not will oneself free one is not acting immorally, but one will also not be very effective at disclosing being, and thus this course of action is likely to lead to misery.
What have we discovered then about existentialist ethics? Fundamentally, existentialist ethics makes man entirely responsible for all values in the world. Man is free to choose his values but he must choose them. If man desires a good life then he should will this very freedom rather than flee it, because in doing so he opens up the possibility of disclosing being. This coupling of ethical behaviour to enjoyable existence is the strength of existentialist ethics – it directly associates ethical conduct with self interest. An individual’s code of conduct is his vehicle to fulfilment. He is thus a powerful arbiter over his behaviour. Man’s ethics are brought into line with those of his society through the interrelationship between the values and projects of each man with those of other men. Our life is lived in a human world and everything we value is therefore intimately bound up with the values and meanings of other men. If I desire a happy life for myself, then I must necessarily desire the means for others to be happy.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
J. P. Sartre – “Existentialism is a Humanism” In Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre ed. Walter Kaufmann, Meridan Publishing Company, 1989, trans. Philip Mairet; retrieved from http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/sartre/works/exist/sartre.htm
Jean-Paul Sartre – “Being and Nothingness”, trans. H. Barnes Routledge, 2005
Alvin Plantinga – “An Existentialist’s Ethics” in The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 12, No. 2 (Dec 1958), pp. 235-256
Simone De Beauvoir – “The Ethics of Ambiguity” New York
David Detmer – “Freedom as a Value” La Salle , IL Open Court , 1986
Kristiana Arp: “The Bonds Of Freedom: Simone De Beauvoir’s existentialist ethics” La Salle , IL Open Court , 2001
Catherine Rau – “The Ethical Theory of Jean-Paul Sartre” in The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 46, no. 17 (Aug, 1949) pp. 536-545
Immanuel Kant – “Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 3rd ed”, trans. James W. Ellington; Hackett. [1785] (1993) pg. 30
Anne Morgan – “Simone De Beauvoir’s Ethics of Freedom and Absolute Evil” in Hypatia, vol. 23, no. 4 (October-December 2008)
Thomas C. Anderson – “Is a Sartrean Ethics Possible?” in Philosophy Today, vol. 14, no. 2, Summer 1970, pp. 116-140
[1]Alvin Plantinga – “An Existentialist’s Ethics” pg. 250, in The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 12, No. 2 (Dec 1958), pp. 235-256
[2] J. P. Sartre – “Existentialism is a Humanism” pg. 3 In Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre ed. Walter Kaufmann, Meridan Publishing Company, 1989, trans. Philip Mairet; retrieved from http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/sartre/works/exist/sartre.htm
[3] Jean-Paul Sartre – “Being and Nothingness” trans. H. Barnes, Routledge 2005, pg. 59
[4] Simone De Beauvoir – “The Ethics of Ambiguity” New York
[5] Simone De Beauvoir – “The Ethics of Ambiguity” pg. 10
[6] Jean-Paul Sartre – “Existentialism is a Humanism” pg. 8
[7] Jean-Paul Sartre – “Existentialism is a Humanism” pg. 9
[8] Simone De Beauvoir – “The Ethics of Ambiguity”, pg. 3
[9] Jean-Paul Sartre – “Existentialism is a Humanism” pg. 5
[10] Jean-Paul Sartre – “Existentialism is a Humanism” pg. 5
[11] Jean-Paul Sartre – “Existentialism is a Humanism” pg. 5
[12] Jean-Paul Sartre – “Existentialism is a Humanism” pg. 3
[13] Jean-Paul Sartre, “Being and Nothingness”, pg. 62
[14] Jean-Paul Sartre – “Existentialism is a Humanism” pg. 4
[15] See Jean-Paul Sartre – “Existentialism is a Humanism” pg. 6
[16] See Simone De Beauvoir – “The Ethics of Ambiguity” pp. 42-73
[17] Alvin Plantinga, ibid. pg. 250
[18] Jean-Paul Sartre – “Existentialism is a Humanism” pg. 11
[19] Simone De Beauvoir – “The Ethics of Ambiguity” pg. 156
[20] Jean-Paul Sartre – “Existentialism is a Humanism” pg. 14
[21] Jean-Paul Sartre – “Being and Nothingness” pg. 646
[22] Simone De Beauvoir – “The Ethics of Ambiguity” pg. 10
[23] Simone De Beauvoir – “The Ethics of Ambiguity” pg. 14
[24] Simone De Beauvoir – “The Ethics of Ambiguity” pg. 23
[25] Simone De Beauvoir – “The Ethics of Ambiguity” pg. 16
[26] Jean-Paul Sartre – “Existentialism is a Humanism” pg. 11
[27] Simone De Beauvoir – “The Ethics of Ambiguity” pg. 24
[28] Simone De Beauvoir – “The Ethics of Ambiguity” pg. 26
[29] Simone De Beauvoir – “The Ethics of Ambiguity” pg. 27
[30] Simone De Beauvoir – “The Ethics of Ambiguity” pg. 159
[31] Jean-Paul Sartre – “Existentialism is a Humanism” pg. 8
[32] David Detmer – “Freedom as a Value” La Salle , IL Open Court , 1986
[33] Jean-Paul Sartre – “Existentialism is a Humanism” pg. 4
[34] Jean-Paul Sartre – “Existentialism is a Humanism” pg. 4
[35] Jean-Paul Sartre – “Existentialism is a Humanism” pg. 4
[36] Kristiana Arp: “The Bonds Of Freedom: Simone De Beauvoir’s existentialist ethics” La Salle , IL Open Court , 2001; pg. 80
[37] Catherine Rau – “The Ethical Theory of Jean-Paul Sartre” pg. 539 in The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 46, no. 17 (Aug, 1949) pp. 536-545
[38] Immanuel Kant – “Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals 3rd ed”, trans. James W. Ellington; Hackett. [1785] (1993) pg. 30
[39] Simone De Beauvoir – “The Ethics of Ambiguity” pg. 74
[40] Kristiana Arp, ibid. pg. 66
[41] Simone De Beauvoir – “The Ethics of Ambiguity” pg. 71
[42] Arp, ibid. pg 6
[43] Anne Morgan – “Simone De Beauvoir’s Ethics of Freedom and Absolute Evil” pg. 81 in Hypatia, vol. 23, no. 4 (October-December 2008)
[44] See Thomas C. Anderson – “Is a Sartrean Ethics Possible?” in Philosophy Today, vol. 14, no. 2, Summer 1970, pp. 116-140
[45] Kristiana Arp, ibid. pg. 151; this idea of two levels of freedom is the central thesis of Arp’s book
[46] Note earlier when I quoted Sartre – “I have to realise the meaning of the world and of my essence; I make my decision concerning them – without justification and without excuse”
[47] Jean-Paul Sartre – “Existentialism is a Humanism” pg. 13
[48] Simone De Beauvoir – “The Ethics of Ambiguity” pg. 25
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