Censorship is offensive

The controversy surrounding the now infamous info-graphic pertaining to Islam and women on the back-page of Woroni presents a great opportunity to discuss the tension between freedom of speech and giving offence. Where do we draw the line for censorship?

A good place to start looking for answers is a controversy that parallels Woroni’s back page. In 1988, Salman Rushdie’s novel The Satanic Verses earned him a Fatwah from the Ayatollah Khomeini, the supreme ruler of Iran, for blasphemy.

The Satanic Verses is principally an exploration of the immigrant experience, but made use of satirical allusions to the Quran as literary devices. In particular, some passages suggested that the ‘Satanic Verses’, a small number of Pagan verses believed to have once been included in the Quran but later removed, were self-interested in origin, questioning the divine motives of the Prophet.

Arguably even more inflammatory were passages where 12 whores in a brothel each take the name of one of the Prophet’s wives.    

In the wake of the Fatwah, a group of intellectuals from across Europe signed a declaration of solidarity, a World Statement (W.S.), with Rushdie. They approached Karl Popper, a notable philosopher of liberalism, who declined to sign. Here’s why:

‘If a W.S. is published, it must, in my opinion, begin by saying that the signatories realise that every freedom (like the freedom to publish) involves a duty (like the duty not to hurt)...And the W.S. would have to continue by saying that Rushdie has now realised the hurt he has caused, and has apologised for it.’

This would seem to come down quite decisively on the side of offensiveness being not okay. But it must be remembered that in liberal nations we consider freedom of speech a right, not a duty.

This is crucial, because rights are institutionally enforced, while duties are the ambit of subjective, individual morality.  Popper underscores this when he emphasises that Rushdie has apologised. The responsibility for restorative justice rests on Rushdie and the offended parties, not institutions.

Yet in Rushdie’s case, in the case of Woroni’s back page, and in Roxon’s recently panned offence laws, institutional power failed to defend free speech and instead sought to chastise someone for being impolite. In Rushdie’s case, his personal decision to be offensive was met with an institutional threat of violence. In the case of the back page, offense was met with an implied threat of expulsion. 

Liberalism, which has coincided with the greatest period of human flourishing in our history, is predicated on fallibilism—the idea that we may be wrong. This is the bedrock of tolerance, cultural relativism, rational public debate and rule of law. Nobody should be able to dictate what is ‘true’ or ‘right’. These claims must always be contested in the public space.

So it is appropriate for the offended to write letters to the editor. This facilitates a discussion. It is equally great that the university assists in mediation, provided that the parties involved are not coerced into attending. But it is not appropriate for people to seek an institutional response to something they find offensive. It is therefore commendable that the international student’s department wants to work with Woroni to prevent further controversy, provided this isn’t just code for a desire to censor.

If we value liberty then we must react critically to institutions, particularly institutions that are meant to stand for reason and critical reflection, taking it upon themselves to decide what is morally okay.

Having institutions dictate truth gives overt power a means to exercise itself independently of collective will. This is precisely what the liberal institutional framework was designed to combat: the oppressive force of a state above the law, an infallible church and an aristocracy who justified their privileges through a moral order that kept the poor beneath ‘their betters’.

A citizenry tough enough to handle satire and criticism is crucial to the robust public space necessary for liberal democratic functioning. Someone will be offended by just about anything. Try reading the ABC complaints compilation if you don’t believe me.

If we start to institutionally constrain actions on the grounds that they cause offence we won’t have a public discourse left. We won’t have the slack to criticise institutions for fear of persecution, and then we’ll be right back in the dark ages before the enlightenment brought us out of Plato’s cave. 

The freedom to offend is an increasingly mainstream controversy and we as a liberal society need to conclude it decidedly in favour of an institutional right to freedom of speech. Offence can be handled by individuals, freedom cannot.