I frequently come across people suggesting that results
from ultimatum and dictator games ‘prove’ that humans are altruistic (which is
stronger than ‘other-regarding’). Indeed, this at times seems to be the intent
of the researchers, what with them calling punishers ‘altruistic punishers’ and
all. I think this is dead wrong. Punishers are optimising over different time
horizons and scales, sometimes time horizons and scales that transcend the
laboratory, much to the chagrin of the researchers no doubt, but a behavioural
psychology lab is very different to that of a natural scientist. Punishers may
well be other regarding, may well be ethical and may well be ‘good people’, but
altruism is a myth.
Both of these games can be played multiple times over
several rounds in which some of the recipients become dictators and vice versa.
This introduces interesting dynamics where dictators know that recipients may
become dictators later and stooge them if they don’t offer something in this
round. Unfortunately, without some contract law or an infinite number of
rounds, you never can be sure whether you won’t be the final dictator able to
make off with a 100% take. In ultimatum games there is an incentive for
recipients in the early rounds of repeated games to reject low offers to
encourage higher offers in later rounds.
Two phenomena encourage some to regard behaviour in these
games as ‘altruistic’. The first is when dictators in single round dictator
games offer amounts greater than zero. This seems insane because there is no
penalty to taking 100% of the dollars if you’re long term goal is to maximise
your income. The second is when recipients reject offers greater than zero in
single-round ultimatum games. This also seems insane because you won’t get a
chance to make money off your decision to forgo income right now.
I propose the following more philosophically palatable
explanation: these behaviours can be explained by the thinking of the ‘altruists’
extending beyond the confines of the laboratory. A recipient who receives a
weak offer in a single-round ultimatum game might think: ‘if I don’t reject
this dickhead now he is going to go out into the world and think he can stooge
people whenever he can get away with it’. Similarly, a generous dictator might
think: ‘I should offer more than zero so that this person thinks there are good
people in the world and takes that attitude with them’. Researchers are reluctant
to consider such explanation because they prefer the illusion that the
experiment stops at the lab. But a psych lab is very different to a sealed room
from of controlled particles.
Such behaviour
makes a lot of sense in a species that relies on collective action. You need to
be able to trust your fellow primates and you need to be certain that if you
behave like a dickhead one of your colleagues is going to come and discipline
you.
This behaviour then is ‘other-regarding’ in the sense
that it considers others because the flourishing
of the group is good for the individual. Such behaviour is not
theoretically undermined by the existence of super-selfish individuals. It
makes evolutionary sense that you want a mix of collectivists and
individualists in a social species. Sometimes you need people who take risks
and do their own thing. Witness socialist countries where people have an equal
share of poverty. Equally it is important to have collectivists to avoid things
like the US economy, which a financial sector policy wonk acquaintance of mine
once described as ‘driving at 80 miles an hour through mountain roads—exhilarating
until you fall off’.
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