I’ve been meaning to
write this since I wrote that piece on neoliberalism
vs. neo-marxism but lacked motivation. Then this week I went to a good
public talk on this stuff where I said some stupid things about market failure.
The end result is that I was galvanised to clarify my thoughts.
Too often in public policy discourse, especially in lay
talk, we fall into a false dichotomy between getting the government to do
everything and the market to do everything. Some quick examples:
There are libertarians in the United States that think we should
have private police forces. Lol.
Then there’s the Greek government who seem to think the
state needs to own restaurants. Lol.
There are some basic criteria for deciding whether a good is
best provided by the government or the market. The market is very good at
allocating scarce resources when the following conditions are met:
-
No externalities
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Perfect competition
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Perfect information
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Clear property rights
-
Private goods (rivalrous and excludable).
In such circumstances (which are common), prices act to
communicate willingness to pay and the person who is willing to pay the most
gets the good. This is market justice and it has elegance to it. Producers
supply enough of the good to clear the market without making a loss; this
efficiently handles the cost of production. Many if not most economic matters
are best handled by markets—butter, shipping, construction services etc.
You only need to consider getting the government involved if
there is a market failure. This includes cases where you have:
-
Externalities
-
Missing markets
-
Information asymmetries
-
No property rights (also common property rights)
-
Public goods (non-rivalrous and non-excludable)
There may also be cause for government involvement in some
cases of moral hazard (though that is usually a reason for private provision)
and adverse selection (a kind of information asymmetry).
Externalities are where a market transaction imposes a cost
or benefit on a third party that isn’t priced in the transaction. For example, if
a factory producing phones emits pollution but isn’t charged for it then you
have an externality. Typically you correct externalities by pricing them, as in
carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes. In the case of positive
externalities there is sometimes a role for government to step in and provide
the service at below the market price and recoup the difference through
taxation. One example is public transport. Mass transit reduces transaction
costs and thereby increases the total size of the economy. This is a benefit
that goes beyond the individual person buying a ticket. As such, it makes sense
for the government to provide public transport, charge less than the market
clearing rate so that more people use it, and then recover the difference
through taxation, which is lucrative because of the increased market activity
as a result of the lower transaction costs.
Public goods will not be provided by the market. This is
because they are non-excludable, which means that you can’t stop people from
using them and so you can’t charge them for usage. One example is street
lights. There is an argument for government provision because they are
non-rivalrous, which means that my consumption of the good does not prevent
your consumption of the good. Music is one example. This means that once the
good has been produced the marginal cost of giving one more person access is
zero. As a result, the social benefit of production can easily outweigh the private
cost. Take a lecture for example. I can
exclude people by restricting access to the lecture hall, so private provision
is a possibility. But lecturing 1 person is as expensive as lecturing 300
people, so it might be better to have the lecture paid for by the state and
then as many people as want to listen to the lecture, including people who get
a benefit from it but wouldn’t want to pay 5c to listen can still benefit.
Information asymmetry and missing markets often go hand in
hand, often with a bit of adverse selection thrown. An example will help illustrate:
health insurance. Insurers don’t know whether someone asking for cover is super
health or only moderately healthy, so they charge them both as though they were
moderately healthy. This is not efficient, but without this approach the insurer
would go broke because they aren’t managing their risks efficiently. If you don’t
let them charge extra then they just won’t ensure people who are clearly a
risk, which leads to a missing market. One solution is to have the state act a
single provider of health insurance and everyone has to buy insurance from the
state. This means that the state can take the entire probability distribution
of the population and make efficient decisions. However, the state is
inefficient because it suffers from moral hazard, which is where you spend
money that you didn’t earn (i.e. the taxpayer gave it to you) and so you’re
loose with it. One partial correction for this is to make the state
sub-contract a lot of its health services to providers who compete amongst
themselves to lower the costs while maintaining quality i.e. inject competition
into the sector. The state is very powerful in this market because it is a
monopsony purchaser of health services. This is an example of imperfect
competition, but here it is arguably helpful.
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