Despite historical misadventures with socialism and
recent positive experiences with liberalisation, India continues to regularly fight
the market. The most recent example is the Delhi government’s move to ban
Uber’s surge pricing in response to a spike in demand the government created
with its odds and evens policy. This regulation can only result in a net social
loss. Cab drivers, who are hardly privileged, earn less money and those who
need a taxi the most and would thus be willing to pay the most for it instead
have to hope to get lucky. In the interests of both efficiency and equity,
India needs to learn how to work with the market instead of against it.
The stimulus for this unrealistic policy was that new
entrants into the freshly deregulated airline industry were more efficient than
their rivals and were thereby able to undercut their rates. Consumers were the
biggest beneficiaries, and if the incompetent airlines were allowed to go bust
without this ending competition among remaining firms, the productivity of the
industry as a whole would improve. Yet to protect a handful of jobs, the
government considered heavy-handed intervention directly into the market.
This is a short-sighted approach. The capital and labour
employed by firms that close is released into the economy to be utilised by
more productive firms. The economy grows and people find new jobs.
The reason why this might not happen is if markets are
rigid. This happens to be the case in India, where labour regulations
discourage hiring and bad debts arising out of lending by state banks to ailing
industries have locked up capital.
This is a self-reinforcing trap that needs to be broken. Rather
than more intervention to fix the damage of intervention, India instead needs
to unwind its distortions and let the resulting market floodwaters lift all
boats.
Using limited state funds to help struggling firms gets
industrial policy backwards. Such firms can only ever shrink.
Helping expanding firms is a sounder approach to job creation and growth. Here
facilitation is the key, notably by getting government bureaucrats out of the
way and providing infrastructure. India unsurprisingly suffers from a shortfall
in ports, roads and railways infrastructure because the money for such
investments has historically gone instead to subsidies for moribund industries.
The damaging effect of India’s aversion to market forces
continues in the realm of trade policy. Here the harm comes from protecting
poor-performing domestic component manufacturers rather than supporting
competitive downstream producers.
A salient example is import restrictions on man-made
fibres (MMF). India has a competitive garment sector and the skills of its
workers could
attract large investment from international enterprises migrating
out of increasingly expensive China. But global markets have shifted in recent
years to demanding more MMF products. These India struggles to produce because
of market distortions.
Raw MMF materials are expensive in India because decades
of subsidies to the cotton industry discouraged the emergence of an MMF
industry. What MMF industry does exist is small-scale and inferior to global
leaders. Indian MMFs are consequently expensive inputs to production, but firms
located in India are forced to use them because of import restrictions.
These include tariffs higher than those in South East
Asia, which World
Bank modelling suggests is consequently set to absorb most of
the business migrating out of China, as well as a 10 per cent excise tax on
MMFs and anti-dumping duties on foreign MMFs that can sometimes exceed 17 per
cent. These policies are retarding the expansion of India’s competitive garment
industry in order to protect a small and weak MMF industry that may never take
off at all. India must consider the wins and not just the losses of market
activity.
India’s aversion to market inequities and its
mercantilist mindset are understandable given its history of colonial
exploitation and enormous poor population. But India’s attempts to help those
disadvantaged by market activity have also hurt them by holding up the nation’s
economic growth.
India needs to move away from market intervention to pre- and post- market interventions instead. This would mean, for instance, a move away from price distorting food subsidies towards cash transfers instead. Such policies correct the inequities of market outcomes without distorting the actual markets. Arguably the best pre- and post-market interventions are those that actively help entities perform in markets without hampering those markets, such as education, health and transport spending — three areas that are all chronically underfunded in India. It is possible to improve social outcomes without dampening economic activity.
India needs to move away from market intervention to pre- and post- market interventions instead. This would mean, for instance, a move away from price distorting food subsidies towards cash transfers instead. Such policies correct the inequities of market outcomes without distorting the actual markets. Arguably the best pre- and post-market interventions are those that actively help entities perform in markets without hampering those markets, such as education, health and transport spending — three areas that are all chronically underfunded in India. It is possible to improve social outcomes without dampening economic activity.
Mark
Fabian is a doctoral candidate in economics at the Crawford School of Public
Policy, The Australian National University.
This article was originally published here, at East Asia Forum.
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