I was teaching a class in ‘The Economic Way of Thinking
Yesterday’ and we did a little thought experiment to try to get an intuitive
understanding of why rational choice is helpful for policy makers. The course
is for public policy students, most of whom have politics backgrounds. The
topic of this thought experiment was something along the lines of ‘how can we
decide where to allocate government resources’? One of the main definitions of
economics is ‘the study of the efficient allocation of scarce resources’.
What
I was trying to show is not only the problem that economics tries to nut out,
but also why a crude but mathematical approach (as opposed to high theory about
say, inequality) might be helpful. I was amazed by how well it all went, so I
thought I’d write it up.
Imagine the government
has $100 million to spend on any of the four following programs. Assume the
government is benevolent and effective, but do not assume that any of these programs
already exists:
a. Disability pensions
b. Tax cuts
c. Public art
d. The Military
What should the government spend the money on?
What ought the government to spend the money on?
The difference between ‘should’ and ’ought’ is that the former
implies a positive statement while the latter implies a normative judgement. We
investigated how economics engages with these issues throughout the thought
experiment.
I led the class in a discussion. First I asked them to rank
their own preferences in secret from 1–4. I then asked whether anybody thought
one or more of these items was not worth spending a cent on, or more clearly,
was worthless. Nobody raised their hand in any of the three classes, so I think
it’s safe to say that most people think these four items are of some value.
I then got information about people’s first preference. For
the first class of 22, it was something like the following. Other class have
different breakdowns, but I’m using this one because the split between tax cuts
and pensions (which are diametrically opposed) was so helpful:
Item
|
1st pref.
|
Pensions
|
9
|
Tax Cuts
|
8
|
Art
|
1
|
Military
|
4
|
We had a quick look to see whether a simple voting mechanism—majority
rules—would deliver an outcome. Here it would not (9 < {0.5*22}). We discuss
more complex voting systems below.
We then turned to the public sphere for a solution. I asked
people with first preferences for each of the items to provide some reasons for
why they think their item should take priority. Some of the volunteered reasons
are given below:
Pensions:
·
The most vulnerable in society need to be
protected
·
Government taxation and spending has a
redistributive role
·
The disabled are in a sense and to a degree reliant
on the society (I asked a follow up question here: ‘but are they reliant on the
state?’)
Tax Cuts:
·
Stimulates economic activity
·
Always popular for the government
·
Libertarian arguments
·
More money in people’s pockets to spend on what they want (i.e. they know how to satisfy
their preferences better than the government)
Arts:
·
Non-rivalrous good
Military:
·
The government’s first priority is to provide
defence and law & order
·
The military provides stability (though too much
military can tip the other way)
·
Need to protect national security and resources
like fisheries
I asked the students whether on the basis of these reasons
anyone had changed their preferences. In one of the classes someone had—more in
favour of tax cuts. The power of dialogue! But there was minimal change in preferences.
I noted that economics tends to take preferences as given, especially in the
sense that preferences will not change
between now and when the relevant decision is going to be made. This is a
powerful simplifying assumption, and one that we have just demonstrated is
often not so silly. Given that almost everyone’s preferences were still the same
after dialogue, we were no closer to a decision about where to allocate
resources than we were before the dialogue.
Next we considered more complex voting systems. A system
that would work here is where you do head-to-head majority rules votes until
all-but one item is eliminated. I can’t be bothered doing the math, but I suspect
that pensions would win there. However, it is possible for that style of voting
to lead to perverse outcomes depending on what head-to-heads take place first.
We instead explored a crude run-off system:
Item
|
1st pref.
|
2nd pref.
|
3rd pref.
|
4th pref.
|
Pensions
|
9*
|
6
|
5
|
0
|
Tax Cuts
|
8
|
8*
|
5
|
3
|
Art
|
1
|
3
|
3
|
15*
|
Military
|
4
|
5
|
9*
|
4
|
At this point, I mentioned the median voter theorem. I had earlier mentioned public choice theory as an application of the economic way of thinking to politics, and most of the students have politics backgrounds, so I thought this would be interesting to them. I drew
it up using a bike paths situation. Canberra has a lot of bike paths because a lot of people like to ride, but it also has a lot of roads because people like
to drive. Those who ride wants lots of bike paths and those who drive would
rather the monies are spent on roads. There are also some intermediate types
who mostly ride but still want roads for when they drive and vice versa. How
might this play out in a stylised situation where we can vote (single-issue) on
between 0 and 5 bike paths and the population is 10?
0 XX
1 XXX
2 XX
3 X
4 X
5 X
In this situation, how many paths will be built? The
students’ intuition kicks in pretty hard and they realise quickly that the
answer is 2 because that’s the half way point—the median. In a single-issue majority-rules vote, coalitions will form and the winner will be determined by who tips the middle. This is the median
voter theorem, which uses some simple mathematical modelling to provide an
insight that allows us to make predictions in the case of more complex
phenomena. Economics does this a lot. More generally, what economics does it to start by making a lot of simplifying assumptions until a basic model can be built. It then proceeds to gradually relax assumptions so that more complexity can be taken into consideration.
Another important point emerges here,
which is that the median is welfare maximising across the whole of society. The
extremes (all roads or all paths) get something, but it is mostly the centre
that dictates things. Having to care about the welfare of everyone in society
and not just the majority makes things quite complicated when it comes to
distributing resources.
Coming back to our example, the median voter would, I
suspect, be somewhere around the dominant preference spread, but again I can’t
be bothered doing the math: pensions (1st), cuts (2nd), military (3rd), and art
(4th). In none of the classes did such a person exist! It is quite possible
that even a preference run off voting style would not result in a welfare
maximising outcome.
At this point, I introduced the notion of a social planner.
Where governments need to get re-elected and so care mostly about just getting a majority vote, the social planner (or technocrat) is interested in something a
little different, namely, maximising welfare for everyone. When we invoke the social
planner, we assume that they are benevolent, unbiased and omniscient, a ludicrous assumption, but a very helpful one for modelling purposes.
To get a sense for the welfare involved in each item, I
asked the students to assume that a first preference was worth 4 points of
utility, the second 3 points and so on. This got us the following:
Item
|
1st pref.
|
2nd pref.
|
3rd pref.
|
4th pref.
|
Total ben.
|
Pensions
|
9 x 4 = 36
|
6 x 3 = 18
|
5 x 2 = 10
|
0 x 1 = 0
|
64
|
Tax Cuts
|
8 x 4 = 32
|
8 x 3 = 24
|
5 x 2 = 10
|
3 x 1 = 3
|
69
|
Art
|
1 x 4 = 4
|
3 x 3 = 9
|
3 x 2 = 6
|
15 x 1 = 15
|
34
|
Military
|
4 x 4 = 16
|
5 x 3 = 15
|
9 x 2 = 18
|
4 x 1 = 4
|
53
|
Tax cuts come out on top as providing the most benefit in
terms of satisfying people’s relative preferences. In this sense, choosing tax cuts is welfare maximising. I mentioned here
that it is critical to understand that what economics cares about is welfare or
utility, not surplus, output, growth or anything like that. Those things are contingently tied to welfare, but it is utility that is the fundamental quantum. It is for this
reason that some economists (notably the Chicago school) think there is a moral
imperative to ignore equity considerations and go for the most Pareto efficient
distribution of resources. This is a classical utilitarian way of conceiving of
social welfare.
Note: Pareto efficiency is where nobody can be made better
off (in terms of utility) without making somebody else worse off. Perfect
markets bring about Pareto-efficient outcomes.
I turned to illustrate this point with one of the most
common mechanisms used in economics: the humble pie. If we, as a class, where making pie, would it be more
important to make the pie as big as possible or to ensure that everyone gets a
fair share of it?
Of course, people say that both are important. I point out
that these are the equity and efficiency criterions. These are crude but
powerful criteria upon which a social planner could decide how to allocate
resources. Economic models, for the most part, show you how to make the pie as
big as possible and how much the pie
shrinks as you make the slices of it more even. I mentioned the disincentive
effects of even the most efficient forms of taxation at this point as an
illustration. Economics as a discipline
passes no judgement upon what the optimal trade off is, but it can illustrate
places where trade-offs can be minimised so that you get lots of bang for your
buck (e.g. cash transfers to poor farmers rather than rice subsidies, or correcting market failures for public goods). This is
very helpful for policy makers. How much equity a society should have is left
to the public to decide and communicate to politicians, who in turn impose
these values upon technocratic social planners.
So economics is often very
crude, but it is also very powerful and something worth having in your analytical arsenal.
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